
When childhood offenders can be treated as adults (under the Youth Justice Act 1992)

Starting point is always section 134: subject to this division, offenders who commit child offences (committed while under the age of 18), <u>must be treated as a child</u> (both for trials and sentences). *Therefore, the starting point is that any childhood offence will be dealt with in the Childrens Court jurisdiction, unless an exception arises.*

PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED WHILE AGED UP TO 18

Must commence in Childrens Court (as no exceptions to 134 arise)




proceeding (140(4))

PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED WHILE AGED 19 OR OLDER

Must commence in Childrens Court (as no exceptions to 134 arise)

Note: *s* 141 has no application, as that section only deals with matters commenced before an offender turns 19¹. Aspects of *s* 140 do, however, apply.

Is the Court satisfied that there was undue delay on the part of the prosecution in starting OR completing the proceeding? (140(4))



Note: there is very little common law guidance on the meaning of 'undue delay on the part of the prosecution'. It is interesting that delay in either commencement or continuation of proceedings appear to provide separate avenues to engaging subsection (4). On a literal approach, it would seem an undue delay in commencing proceedings would still engage subsection (4), even if the offender delayed completion of the matter; and vice versa.

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 $^{^{\}rm 1}$ R v WBR [2022] QCA 62 at [10] per McMurdo JA.